The Imagination Is a Fertile Stomping Ground: Non-Enumerated Grounds for Departure from the United States Sentencing Guidelines under 5K2.0 by Cordle, Jennifer L.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1999
The Imagination Is a Fertile Stomping Ground:
Non-Enumerated Grounds for Departure from the
United States Sentencing Guidelines under 5K2.0
Jennifer L. Cordle
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer L. Cordle, The Imagination Is a Fertile Stomping Ground: Non-Enumerated Grounds for Departure from the United States
Sentencing Guidelines under 5K2.0, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 193 (1999)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/5
 193 
THE IMAGINATION IS A FERTILE STOMPING GROUND:  
NON-ENUMERATED GROUNDS FOR DEPARTURE FROM THE 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES UNDER § 5K2.0 
JENNIFER L. CORDLE1 
  INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 194 
 I. BACKGROUND...................................................................... 196 
 A. Pre-Guidelines Sentencing System .............................. 196 
 B. United States Sentencing Guidelines ........................... 198 
 II. DEPARTURES........................................................................ 200 
 A. Types of Departure Grounds ....................................... 201 
 1. Forbidden.............................................................. 201 
 2. Encouraged ........................................................... 201 
 3. Discouraged .......................................................... 202 
 4. Unmentioned (non-enumerated)........................... 203 
 B. Non-enumerated Departures under § 5K2.0 ............... 203 
 1. § 5K2.0 ................................................................. 203 
 a. Unlimited Possibilities .................................. 203 
 b. Extraordinary factors .................................... 204 
 c. Combinations ................................................ 205 
 2. Koon v. United States ........................................... 205 
 3. Analysis ................................................................ 209 
 C. Successful Considerations when Choosing  
  Grounds for Departure ................................................ 213 
 1. Rehabilitation ....................................................... 213 
 2. Third Party Harm.................................................. 214 
 3. Voluntary Conduct ............................................... 216 
 4. Unfairness Resulting from Government  
  Conduct................................................................. 217 
 5. “Just Deserts” ....................................................... 218 
 6. Judges ................................................................... 219 
 III. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 220 
                                                                
1Ms. Cordle received a B.A. from Ohio University and a J.D. from Capital University Law 
School.  She is a law clerk for Federal Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King.  This article 
was written and accepted for publication prior to her employment with Judge King; 
accordingly, the views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not 
reflect the views or opinions of Judge King or the other judges for the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio.  Special thanks to Max Kravitz, Professor of Law, 
Capital University Law School, for his assistance and review of the drafts of this article. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
194 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:193 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice has sometimes been represented by the blindfolded icon, Justicia.  
This ancient metaphor is appropriate for adjudication.  In deciding guilt or 
innocence, it ought not to matter whether the defendant is rich or poor, nor 
whether the defendant has erred in the past, or suffered unusual 
disadvantages, nor even whether the defendant is likely to break the law 
again.  The decision on guilt or innocence is properly blind to these 
circumstances, blind to everything but the question of whether the 
defendant’s actions and accompanying mental state instantiate the abstract 
features specified in a criminal statute.  The character of this 
determination is represented by the icon’s scales.  Essentially a matter of 
weighing evidence and determining facts, the process of adjudication has 
more in common with scientific than with moral reasoning. 
But Justicia usually is depicted also holding a sword, representing not the 
power to determine guilt or innocence, but the power to punish.  Before 
that power is exercised, before the sword is raised, Justicia must raise the 
blindfold.  When it comes to the imposition of punishment, the question is 
always one of degree.  The need is not for blindness, but for insight, for 
equity, for what Aristotle called “the correction of the law where it is 
defective owing to its universality,” and this can only occur in a judgment 
that takes account of the complexities of the individual case.2 
Individuality in sentencing is a hallmark of true justice.  The universality of law 
results in a “canned justice,” which provides for similar sentences for similar crimes, 
but does not account for the bundle of characteristics in the offender which 
contributed to that offender’s particular form of criminality.3  This is not necessarily 
justice at all,4 but administrative convenience.  The United States Sentencing 
Commission, which provides for uniformity through a series of detailed guidelines, 
recognized the need for individuality in sentencing by allowing for discretionary 
departures.   
Though the Sentencing Guidelines provide some direction regarding departures, 
the Commission did not take all factors that may be relevant into account when 
developing the guidelines.  The majority of departures are unguided and fall under 
                                                                
2Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1283 (1997). 
3
“There are occasions where the law’s implacability must bend and give homage through 
compassion to humanity’s frailties and nature’s cruelties.”  United States v. Perez, 756 F. 
Supp. 698, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).  “[N]ot all seemingly similar offenders are in fact similar, 
and there are atypical situations when justice is best served by different sentences for different 
people.”  Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens:  Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated 
Disparity?  One Judge’s Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1997). 
4
“Unfortunately, not all ‘similarly situated’ offenders are truly similarly situated in terms 
of their diverse offender and complex human circumstances.  To this end, fixed rules coupled 
with narrowly guided policy statements are, on occasion, insufficient and inappropriate.”  Kirk 
D. Houser, Downward Departures:  The Lower Envelope of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 361, 389 (1993). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/5
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the catch-all provision, United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter USSG) 
§ 5K2.0.  This provision is a safety valve that exists in order to permit judges to do 
justice in extraordinary cases.5  Though judges possessed this discretion, they 
believed departures were disfavored under the Sentencing Guidelines.6  However, 
Koon v. United States7 “reemphasized and clarified that district courts do have broad 
departure discretion.”8 
                                                                
5See Gregory N. Racz, Exploring Collateral Consequences:  Koon v. United States, Third 
Harm, and Departures From Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1462, 1463 
(1997); Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing:  
Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1697, 1701 (1998). 
[S]ection 5K2.0 is meant to operate as a safety valve in those less frequent occasions 
where an important or extraordinary circumstance not duly considered by the 
Sentencing Commission is present . . . . 5K2.0 is not to be applied as a matter of 
course by district judges.  Rather it enables judges bound by the guidelines to impose 
fair and particularized sentences . . . in unique or unanticipated circumstances. 
 
Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Departures 
in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 808 (1994).  For a war story in which a 
district judge acted as an antidote to the poisonous disparity resulting from prosecutorial 
discretion under the Guidelines, see Houser, supra note 4, at 389 n. 213.  The judge stated: 
Let me tell you, and you can take this message back to the United States Attorney’s 
office:  I think it is my job to see that justice is meted out fairly, and that’s what the 
guidelines are trying to do—supposedly trying to do.  And there seems to be a lack of 
coordination in your office on how these cases are handled. 
I sentenced five men the other day in a gigantic conspiracy.  I mean these guys were 
out there unloading marijuana from planes.  And two of the plea agreements provided 
for probation.  And you want these 18, 21-year old guys to get 27 months when your 
office comes in here and makes deals suggesting probation or three years for guys who 
are involved in giant conspiracies involving millions of dollars. 
Maybe your office doesn’t see it, because you each handle different cases, and have 
different philosophies, but I see it every day.  And as long as I have anything to say 
about it, justice is going to be [handed] out on an even basis.  I don’t care if they are 
from Mexico, Canada or the United States.  We are going to handle it the way I see 
[it], and the way I think is right and fair. 
 
United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting District Judge 
Alfredo C. Marquez and affirming a downward departure for the marginal culpability of drug 
“mules”). 
6See Saris, supra note 3, at 1040. 
7518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
8Stephanie M. Wright, How Koon v. U.S. Clarifies Courts’ Discretion to Depart from 
Sentencing Guidelines, 11 No. 4 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1, 1 (1997);  see also Lisa M. 
Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A Tale of Two 
Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 569 (1998) (Koon “endorsed district court discretion and 
individual consideration of defendants.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland:  
Departure Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 19, 19 (1996) (the Supreme Court 
argued “in favor of [a] shift toward increased district court departure authority . . . .”). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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Due to the Court’s seeming encouragement of judicial discretion in relation to 
departures, the courts’ ability to depart has been expanded from that previously in 
force.  “Post-Koon, with the exception of the forbidden factors, there appears to be 
no limit to the kinds of factors which may constitute grounds for departure in an 
unusual case.”9  When considering possible factors for departure from the Sentencing 
Guidelines, one is only bound by the limits of one’s imagination.  One should be 
“imaginative and proactive in finding grounds to depart downward.”10  Any factor, 
either alone or in combination with other factors, may be sufficiently atypical to 
warrant departure.   
Section I of this article describes the sentencing systems in effect in the United 
States both before and after the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Section II 
discusses the types of departure grounds, explains when a non-enumerated ground 
for departure may be appropriate in light of Koon, and suggests general 
characteristics that appear to underlie successful non-enumerated departures.  
Section III concludes that departures will be more common-place after Koon and 
encourages attorneys to be imaginative when exploring potential grounds for 
departure. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Pre-Guidelines Sentencing System 
The sentencing scheme in place within the United States prior to the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 was one of indeterminate sentencing.  This system involved a 
“three-way sharing of sentencing responsibility,”11 with responsibility delegated 
between Congress, the sentencing judge, and the Parole Commission.  The reasoning 
behind this delegation was that “if a given policy can be implemented only by a 
combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive 
implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked 
will.”12 
Congress defined the maximum sentence that could be imposed by developing a 
“system of ranges within which the sentencer could choose the precise punishment” 
for each defendant. 13  These “[s]tatutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly 
always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide” the offender’s 
punishment.14  The judge’s discretion was enhanced by the fact that the judge could 
later suspend the sentence that was imposed upon the defendant or replace that 
sentence with probation.15 
                                                                
9Wright, supra note 8, at 1. 
10Farabee, supra note 8, at 569. 
11Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). 
12United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). 
13Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. 
14Id. at 363.  The sentencing judge possessed the “discretion to decide whether the 
offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether he should be fined and how much, 
and whether some lesser restraint, such as probation should be imposed instead of 
imprisonment or fine.”  Id.   
15See id. at 364. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/5
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The Parole Commission was the third organization to exercise authority over the 
defendant’s sentence.  Congress granted “corrections personnel within the Executive 
Branch the discretion to release a prisoner before the expiration of the sentence 
imposed by the judge.”16  It was the parole official who ultimately determined the 
actual duration of the defendant’s incarceration.17  When paroled, the offender “was 
returned to society under the ‘guidance and control’ of a parole officer.”18 
The sentencing judge and the Parole Commission were given such broad 
discretion because the indeterminate sentencing scheme was based upon the goal of 
rehabilitation.19  This model held that “it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the 
inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon 
his return to society.”20  The reform of the inmate resulted from “a rigid system of 
discipline, labor, and religion.”21  This underlying theory “required the judge and the 
parole officer to make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their 
own assessments of the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation.”22  Because these 
decisions were based upon individualized observations, the judge’s sentencing 
determination “met with virtually unconditional deference upon appeal,”23 and the 
Parole Commission “possessed almost absolute discretion over the parole 
decision.”24 
The indeterminate sentencing scheme, due to the high level of discretion 
delegated to judges and parole officials, developed serious problems.  Sentencing 
disparities occurred as a result of the judges’ broad discretion.25  This discretion led 
                                                                
16Id.  
17See id. at 365. 
18Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
19See Lisa M. Rebello, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Five Years 
of “Guided Discretion,”  26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1992); see also Karin Bornstein, 
5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual Characteristics:  A Backdoor Out of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135, 137 (1992).  “It is generally 
accepted that there are four theories of criminal punishment:  retribution, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence.”  Id. 
20Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.  This belief stemmed from the concept of crime as “a moral 
disease, and punishment, a ‘social therapeutic’ designed to reform the criminal rather than to 
inflict suffering.”  Bornstein, supra note 19, at 137. 
21Rebello, supra note 19, at 1033. 
22Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
23Id. at 364.  The sentencing judge “enjoyed the ‘superiority of his nether position’” 
because he could “‘see[ ] more and sense[ ] more’ than the appellate court.”  Id. 
24Id.  
25See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure 
Jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) 
(“Troubling assumptions concerning race, ethnicity, economic status, and gender were often at 
the heart of these disparities.”); see also Panel Discussion, Equality Versus Discretion in 
Sentencing, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1813 (1989) for the criticism that  
unfettered judicial discretion provided a shield for discrimination:  some district court 
judges systematically treated blacks and hispanics more harshly, while others used the 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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to the belief that “federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to 
offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under 
similar circumstances.”26  Uncertainty regarding the length of a defendant’s actual 
imprisonment resulted from the Parole Commission’s discretion regarding whether a 
defendant should be paroled.  Uncertainty also surrounded the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation as a penological theory.27  In the face of “[f]undamental and 
widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties and the disparities [that] continued 
to be expressed,”28 Congress took action in an attempt to improve the criminal 
sentencing system. 
B.  United States Sentencing Guidelines 
“Because the existing indeterminate sentencing system resulted in serious 
disparities among the sentences imposed by federal judges upon similarly situated 
offenders and in uncertainty as to an offender’s actual date of release by Executive 
Branch parole officials, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”29  
With this Act, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission and 
charged it with developing a comprehensive set of sentencing guidelines.30  The 
Commission was to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal 
criminal justice system31 by promulgating binding sentencing guidelines that 
establish a range of determinate sentences for all categories of federal offenses and 
defendants.32  Congress consolidated the power that had been exercised by the judge 
and the Parole Commission33 in the outmoded rehabilitation model. 34 
The goal of the resulting United States Sentencing Guidelines is “to reduce 
unjustified disparities and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are 
the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.”35  This goal is 
                                                          
court to promote a system of alleged justice, where minorities were given light 
sentences as an accommodation to past societal wrongs, the latter pattern without 
regard for the dire consequences this practice holds for minority and other victims. 
 
Id. at 1815 (statement by Commissioner Iliene H. Nagel). 
26S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 38 (1983). 
27See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365.  Rehabilitation came to be viewed as an unattainable goal 
for the majority of cases.  Id.  Empirical research indicated that rehabilitation was not working 
and concluded that the “rehabilitative disposition is plainly untenable.”  Bornstein, supra note 
19, at 139 n.18. 
28Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366. 
29Id. at 361. 
30Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996). 
3128 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1988). 
32See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
33See id. at 367. 
34S.Rep. No. 98-225 (1983). 
35Koon, 518 U.S. at 113. 
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accomplished by focusing on the congressional objectives of honesty,36 uniformity,37 
and proportionality.38  The Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a 
degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.39  The Guidelines also provide 
discretion to sentencing judges to consider each defendant as an individual with a 
unique case.40  The main purpose of the Sentencing Commission was:  
to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal 
justice system that provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating 
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing 
practices.41 
In addition to creating the Sentencing Commission, the Act did other things.  
First, it rejected rehabilitation as a goal of incarceration.42  Second, the Act generally 
made all sentences determinate43 and binding on judges, with one exception.44  Third, 
it prospectively abolished the Parole Commission.45  Finally, the Act authorized 
limited appellate review of the district judge’s sentencing determination:46  A 
defendant is permitted to appeal if the sentence is above the defined range; the 
                                                                
36
“‘Honesty’ in sentencing refers to the length of imprisonment that an offender actually 
serves versus that imposed by the sentencing judge.”  Rebello, supra note 19, at 1040 n.6.  The 
Commission hoped to achieve honesty in sentencing by abolishing parole.  See id. at 1040. 
37Uniformity in sentencing is meting out “similar sentences for similar conduct by similar 
offenders, or treating similar cases alike.”  Id. 
38
“‘[P]roportionality’ refers to sentences of different severity for unlike offenses, or 
treating different cases differently.”  Id. at 1040 n.6. 
39Koon, 518 U.S. at 113. 
40See id.  The Koon Court stated: 
It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing 
judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique 
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime 
and the punishment to ensue.  We do not understand it to have been the congressional 
purpose to withdraw all sentencing discretion from the United States District Judge.  
Discretion is reserved within the Sentencing Guidelines . . . . 
Id. 
4128 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
42See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1998). 
43See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (1994). 
44See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)-(b) (1994).  The courts are authorized to depart from the 
applicable guideline if the judge finds “an aggravating or mitigating factor present that the 
Commission did not adequately consider when formulating guidelines.”  § 3553(b). 
45See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(1) (1994). 
46See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)-(b) (1994). 
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government may appeal if it is below the range; and either side can appeal an 
improper application of a guideline.47 
When determining a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines the judge begins 
by identifying the base offense level assigned to the crime in question.48  If the judge 
finds the case to be a typical one, he must impose a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range.49  If the case is not a typical one, the judge “adjusts the base level as 
the Guidelines instruct.”50  There a four basic steps that a judge should follow when 
determining whether a departure is in order.  The judge should ask:  
 
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ 
“heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual case? 
2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features? 
3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features? 
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those features?51 
 
Finally, the judge determines the defendant’s criminal history category.  
Coordinating the adjusted offense level and criminal history category yields the 
appropriate sentencing range.52 
II.  DEPARTURES 
The Introduction to the Guidelines [Manual] . . . makes an important distinction 
between a “heartland case” and an “unusual case.”53  The Manual explains: 
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guidelines as 
carving out a “heartland,” a set of typical cases embodying the conduct 
that each guideline describes.  When a court finds an atypical case, one to 
which a particular guidelines linguistically applies but where conduct 
                                                                
47See id. 
48Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996). 
49See id. at 85. 
50See id. at 88. 
51Id. at 95 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).  In Rivera, 
the court explained: 
If no special features are present, or if special features are also “forbidden” features, 
then the sentencing court, in all likelihood, simply would apply the relevant 
guidelines.  If the special features are “encouraged” features, the court would likely 
depart, sentencing in accordance with the Guidelines’ suggestions.  If the special 
features are “discouraged” features, the court would go on to decide whether the case 
is nonetheless not “ordinary,” i.e., whether the case differs from the ordinary case in 
which those features are present.  If the case is not ordinary, the court would go on to 
consider departure. 
 
Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949. 
52Koon, 518 U.S. at 88. 
53Rivera, 994 F.2d at 947. 
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significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a 
departure is warranted.54 
A factor is not part of the heartland if “the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines 
that should result in a sentence different from that described.”55  Atypical cases were 
not adequately considered by the Commission, and factors that make a case atypical 
provide potential bases for departure.56 
A.  Types of Departure Grounds 
1.  Forbidden 
After determining that a factor does not fit within the heartland of the applicable 
statute, one must look to see whether the Commission has forbidden consideration of 
the factor.  The Commission forbade consideration of several factors, including: 1) 
race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status;57 2) lack of 
guidance as a youth;58 3) drug or alcohol dependence;59 and 4) economic hardship.60  
These factors may never be part of the determination regarding whether a departure 
from the sentencing range is appropriate.  Thus, even if these factors make a case 
‘unusual,’ taking it outside an individual guideline’s heartland, the sentencing court 
is not free to consider departing.61 
2.  Encouraged 
After determining that a potential departure factor is not a forbidden factor, it 
must be determined whether departure is encouraged in light of this factor.  The 
Commission offers judges assistance by providing a “host of considerations that may 
take a particular case outside the ‘heartland’ of any individual guideline and, in 
doing so, may warrant a departure.”62  “Encouraged factors are those ‘the 
Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the 
                                                                
54UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL,  USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, 
intro. comment 4(b) (1995). 
5518 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements § 5K Policy 
Statement (1987). 
56See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94. 
57See USSG § 5H1.10. 
58See USSG § 5H1.12. 
59See USSG § 5H1.4. 
60See USSG § 5H2.12. 
61United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993); But see United States v. Yu, 
954 F.2d 951, 958 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that, per the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
report, “‘the requirement of neutrality is not a requirement of blindness’ toward race, sex, 
national origin, creed and socio-economic status.”). 
62Rivera, 994 F.2d. at 948. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
202 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:193 
guidelines.’”63  Factors that warrant a downward departure from any given sentence 
include conduct of the victim that provoked the offense behavior,64 when a defendant 
commits a crime in order to avoid a greater harm,65 if a defendant commits a crime 
due to coercion or duress,66 and if a defendant committed an offense while suffering 
from a significantly reduced mental capacity.67  “A sentencing court facing such non-
heartland circumstances can feel confident, because of this encouragement, that a 
departure would not be ‘unreasonable.’”68  However, encouraged factors are not 
always an appropriate basis for departuresometimes the applicable guideline has 
contemplated the factor.69  In such a circumstance, a court may depart based upon the 
factor, but only if the factor is “present to a degree substantially in excess of that 
which ordinarily is involved in the offense.”70 
3.  Discouraged 
Those factors that are “not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a 
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range” are discouraged factors.71  
Examples of discouraged factors include age;72 education and vocational skills;73 
mental and emotional conditions;74 physical condition;75 employment record;76 
community and family ties and responsibilities;77 and military, civic, charitable or 
public service record.78  The Commission discourages, but does not absolutely 
forbid, the use of these factors when considering a departure.79  Though the 
Guidelines do not provide for adjustments based upon these factors, the factors do 
not automatically take a case outside of the heartland.80  Such factors could remove a 
                                                                
63Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) (quoting USSG § 5K2.0). 
64See USSG § 5K2.10. 
65See USSG § 5K2.11. 
66See USSG § 5K2.12. 
67See USSG § 5K2.13. 
68Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948. 
69See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. 
70USSG § 5K2.0 (Policy Statement). 
71USSG Ch. 5, Pt. H, Introductory Commentary. 
72See USSG § 5H1.1. 
73See USSG § 5H1.2. 
74See USSG § 5H1.3. 
75See USSG § 5H1.4. 
76See USSG § 5H1.5. 
77See USSG § 5H1.6. 
78See USSG § 5H1.11. 
79See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993). 
80See id.  
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case from the heartland only if they are “present in a manner that is unusual or 
special, rather than ordinary.”81  In order for a discouraged factor to result in a 
departure, the sentencing judge must determine that it is present in unusual kind or 
degree.82 
4.  Unmentioned (non-enumerated) 
If the Guidelines are silent regarding a factor, i.e. the factor is not a forbidden, 
encouraged or discouraged factor, the courts may analyze the factor when 
considering a departure.  “If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court 
must, after considering the ‘structure and theory of both relevant individual 
guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole,’ decide whether it is sufficient to 
take the case out of the Guidelines heartland.”83  If it is decided that a departure is 
appropriate, the authority for the departure is USSG § 5K2.0, the catch-all provision. 
B.  Non-enumerated Departures under § 5K2.0 
1.  § 5K2.0 
a.  Unlimited Possibilities 
The Sentencing Reform Act did not eliminate all of the district court’s traditional 
sentencing discretion because the Commission formulated each guideline to apply to 
a “heartland of typical cases.”84  USSG § 5K2.0 is a catch-all provision that allows 
for the independent exercise of judicial discretion by means of departures due to 
grounds that are not discussed within the Guidelines.85  In fact, this section provides 
sentencing judges with “significant opportunity . . . to depart from the Guidelines in 
a number of different scenarios.”86 
The Guidelines “do not purport to—nor can they—take into account all factors 
that do and should affect sentencing.”87  The Sentencing Guidelines include a catch-
all departure provision because Congress and the Sentencing Commission realized 
that the Guidelines could not address every possible scenario.  The guideline reads, 
“Circumstances that may warrant departure from the guideline range pursuant to this 
provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in 
advance.”88  This lack of consideration is positive because “[a] sentencing system 
tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case would quickly become 
unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent 
                                                                
81Id. 
82See id.  Discouraged factors should only be relied upon for departure “in exceptional 
cases.” USSG ch. 5, pt. H, Introductory Commentary.   
83Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). 
84Wright, supra note 8, at 1; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92. 
85See Farabee, supra note 8, at 569. 
86Id. 
87Saris, supra note 3, at 1030-31. 
88USSG § 5K2.0. 
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effect.”89  “A rigid, mechanized application which straightjackets a sentencing court 
should be avoided.”90 
The Guidelines not only instruct that it cannot completely list all grounds that 
may be relevant to a particular offense and its offender, but it also provides that the 
Commission did not intend to limit the factors that may constitute grounds for 
departure.91  Other than the grounds that are forbidden, the Guidelines “place 
essentially no limit on the number or potential factors that may warrant departure.”92  
In fact, Congress stated explicitly in 18 U.S.C. § 3661 that “the court cannot be 
limited in the information that it may review and consider concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a defendant awaiting sentencing.”93   
b.  Extraordinary factors 
The Commission amended § 5K2.0 two different times in order to provide 
enough flexibility in the Guidelines to allow justice to be done in individual 
circumstances.  One amendment added a paragraph explaining that discouraged 
factors, though not ordinarily relevant to a departure consideration, were not 
categorically prohibited from consideration.94  These factors may warrant departure 
when they are present to an extraordinary degree.   
The Sentencing Reform Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) were amended by the 
Sentencing Act of 1987, which added the words “of a kind or to a degree” after its 
general description of when a departure is in order.95  The Commission soon added 
the phrase to § 5K2.0 as well.  This phrase was inserted so that practitioners would 
understand that factors that have been considered by the Commission may constitute 
adequate grounds for departure under the proper circumstance.  The ‘degree’ factor 
is essentially triggered in situations where it is apparent that the Commission did 
adequately consider a given factor as a type or kind, but that factor is present in a 
                                                                
89Houser, supra note 4, at 366.   
90Id. at 367. 
91See 1998 USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A., intro. comment 4(b). 
92Id.; see also Racz, supra note 5, at 1464 (stating that “the range of grounds for departure 
is nearly limitless”). 
93Tony Garoppolo, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 
CRIM. L. BULL. 291, 291 (1990).  The Commission similarly stated, “In determining the 
sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the Guidelines is 
warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the 
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.”  
USSG § 1B1.4. 
94See USSG § 5K2.0. 
Finally, an offender characteristic or other circumstance that is, in the Commission’s 
view, “not ordinarily relevant” in determining whether a sentence should be outside 
the applicable guideline range may be relevant to this determination if such 
characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the 
case from the “heartland” cases covered by the guidelines. 
Id. 
95See Garoppolo, supra note 93, at 295. 
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particular case to an extreme degree that could not have been adequately 
contemplated by the Commission.96  The amendment was designed to “make clear 
what [was] already implicit in current law.”97  
c.  Combinations 
Although a “single mitigating factor may not warrant a downward departure,”98 
the Guidelines allow for departure when a combination of factors that may not be 
sufficient in isolation exist in such a way that a case is atypical, thus falling outside 
of the Guideline’s heartland.99  “The factors in any particular case do not exist in 
isolation.  The totality of the individual circumstances may well converge to create 
the unusual circumstances not contemplated by the Commission.”100   
This allowance was not always included in § 5K2.0.  Congress amended the 
section in order to broaden its scope and to increase the number of departures in the 
future.  The pre-amendment Guidelines were not allowing judge’s sufficient 
discretion to do justice. 
2.  Koon v. United States 
After the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines, judges thought that departures 
were unfavored due to the Guidelines’ purpose of eliminating disparity that resulted 
from overabundant judicial discretion.101  However, the Supreme Court decision in 
Koon v. United States changed the way judicial discretion in relation to sentencing is 
viewed.102  Koon not only affirmed the role of departures,103 but it broadened judicial 
discretion to individualize punishment under the Guidelines.   
                                                                
96Id. 
97Michael S. Gelacak, et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An 
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 328 (1996). 
98Alan Ellis, Baker’s Dozen:  Tips for the Experienced Advocate, 11 CRIM. JUST. 34, 35 
(1997). 
99See USSG § 5K2.0, comment (“The Commission does not foreclose the possibility of an 
extraordinary case that, because of a combination of such characteristics or circumstances, 
differs significantly from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is 
important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or 
circumstances individually distinguishes the case.  However, the Commission believes that 
such circumstances will be extremely rare.”).   
100See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1993). 
101See Saris, supra note 3, at 1040.  Also, despite the broad latitude provided for departure 
under the Sentencing Reform Act, “many judges consider themselves bound by the 
Commission’s advice in the Part 5H policy statement that certain offender characteristics are 
‘not ordinarily relevant’ to sentencing.”  Houser, supra note 4, at 367. 
102But see Johnson, supra note 5, at 1746 for the proposition that “because one could 
interpret Koon’s abuse of discretion standard to encompass much of the pre-Koon appellate 
review, it may effect little change (and therefore impose little damage).”  Johnson also 
maintains that “the vast majority of guidelines are unlikely to be affected by Koon.”  Id; see 
also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 2, at 14, for the argument that “a thorough and candid 
assessment of Koon requires the conclusion that it has not changed matters significantly, and 
perhaps not at all.”  Stith and Cabranes also comment that “despite Koon’s expansive dicta 
regarding the scope of sentencing court discretion, federal appellate courts have not generally 
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In Koon, the Court basically did four things.  First, the Court determined that the 
appropriate standard of review for departure appeals was abuse of discretion.104  
Second, the Court explained that the Guidelines preserved the traditional discretion 
of sentencing judges to reach a just sentence in each case.105  Third, it maintained that 
authority should primarily rest with district court judges regarding departures 
because, as a group, they have more experience with Guidelines cases than appellate 
court judges.106  Finally, the Court adopted the “heartland” concept.107   
When the Supreme Court adopted the abuse of discretion standard of review for 
sentencing determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines it “changed materially 
the level of deference owed to such decisions.”108  The Court reasoned that under the 
old law, sentencing decisions were not reviewable on appeal.109  Though it 
recognized that Congress altered this scheme when it adopted the Sentencing Reform 
Act, the Court reiterated that this appellate review was a limited review.110  
Congress’ intention not to give appellate courts “wide-ranging authority over district 
court sentencing decisions”111 is demonstrated by its admonition to “give due 
deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”112  The 
Court argued, “The development of the guidelines sentencing regime has not 
changed our view that, except to the extent specifically directed by statute, ‘it is not 
the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing 
court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.’”113 
The Court also explained that an abuse of discretion standard is in order because 
the Guidelines did not intend to strip sentencing judges of their traditional 
                                                          
recognized the decision as granting sentencing judges greater departure authority than had 
existed.”  Id.; see also Paul J. Hofer, et al., Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v. U.S., 9 
FED. SENT. REP. 284 (1997).  Hofer explains that the “data from the first nine months of Koon 
has not reflected significant changes in the rates of departure and the reasons for departure.  
See Francesca D. Bowman, Has Koon Undermined the Guidelines, 9 FED. SENT. 32 (1996) 
(for the proposition that “[a]lthough it is too soon to discern a long-term effect, it does not 
appear that the Koon decision is undermining the guidelines at this point”). 
103See Racz, supra note 5, at 1464. 
104See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996). 
105See id. at 97. 
106See id. at 99. 
107See id. at 93-94. 
108Johnson, supra note 5, at 1724.  Abuse of discretion is a dramatically more deferential 
review than the previous approach in which departure decisions were strictly reviewed; see 
also Francesca Bowman, supra note 102, at 32 (discussing the fear that an abuse of discretion 
standard would cause a return to a highly discretionary, largely unreviewed sentencing 
practice). 
109See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. 
110See id. 
111Id. at 82. 
112Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)). 
113Id. at 97 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992)).   
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discretion,114 but rather, Congress manifested an “intent that district courts retain 
much of their traditional sentencing discretion.”115  It viewed the Guidelines system 
as “minimally disruptive of the individual sentencing judge’s traditional 
prerogatives” and that judges retain “substantial latitude to depart.”116  Today, a 
district judge’s departure decision “embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by 
a sentencing court.”117  This traditional exercise of discretion historically has been 
very broad.118 
The district courts’ place in the scheme of things also supports an abuse of 
discretion standard of review according to the Supreme Court.  District courts are 
“better suited than appellate courts” to decide whether a departure is warranted in a 
particular situation.119  This “institutional advantage over appellate courts” results 
from the fact that district courts “see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate 
courts do.”120  Also, district courts have an advantage over appellate courts in that 
they may decide whether a departure should be granted by comparing a particular 
case with the facts of other Guidelines cases that they have seen.121  In this sense, 
district court judges utilize their “day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing” 
                                                                
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Johnson, supra note 5, at 1724. 
117Koon, 518 U.S. at 98; see also Frank Bowman, supra note 8, at 19.  Bowman refers to 
this conclusion as “pure banana oil” because the traditional sentencing discretion of district 
courts was virtually unlimited prior to the Guidelines.  Id.  He argued, “The whole point of the 
guidelines was to hem in district courts with a set of rules created by the Commission and 
enforced by courts of appeal.”  Id.  He points out: 
[T]o suggest, as the Court plainly does in Koon, that a decision to depart from the 
sentencing range prescribed by the guidelines is discretionary in the same way that all 
sentencing before the guidelines was discretionary, or in the same way that imposition 
of a sentence within the guideline range is now discretionary, is to disembowel the 
guidelines at a stroke.  If discretion to depart were in truth a remnant of “traditional 
sentencing discretion” preserved to sentencing judges by the SRA, then the guidelines 
would be advisory rather than mandatory. 
Id. 
118See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
119Frank Bowman, supra note 8, at 19; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 99 (maintaining that 
district courts have a “special competence—about the ‘ordinariness’ or ‘unusualness’ of a 
particular case . . . .”). 
120Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. 
121See id.  
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
208 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:193 
when deciding whether to grant a departure,122 and this factor should not be 
overridden by a less experienced appellate court.123   
The Court also explicitly recognized the importance of the “heartland” concept to 
sentencing under the Guidelines.  It explained that the Commission “formulated each 
guideline to apply to a heartland of typical cases.”124  The heartland embodies 
conduct that each guideline describes,125 and if the conduct in a particular case falls 
outside this set of average conduct, then a departure may be warranted because the 
case is atypical.126  In relation to this concept, the Court adopted the paradigm in 
which departures should be reviewed to determine whether the potential departure 
factor is forbidden, encouraged, discouraged, or unmentioned by the Guidelines.127 
                                                                
122Id.  But see Johnson, supra note 5, at 1731 (for the argument that “it is precisely the 
perspective provided by the appellate courts’ distance from individual cases that enables them 
to provide principled guidance and promote greater consistency among individual sentencing 
judges”). 
123But see Frank Bowman, supra note 8, at 19.  Bowman claims that district court judges 
are not more experienced than appellate court judges regarding Guidelines cases.  He argues: 
First, there are roughly five district court judges for every judge on a court of appeals.  
Assume for the sake of illustration that in 1994 each district court judge handled 
twenty guidelines cases.  If so, there would be 100 guidelines cases sentenced at the 
district court level for every appellate judge.  If the figure cited by the Supreme Court 
for percentage of guidelines cases appealed in 1994 (6.1%) were correct, there would 
be roughly six guidelines appeals per sitting appellate judge.  But because three judges 
sit on each appellate panel, each appellate judge would hear eighteen guidelines 
appeals per year.  In short, even if the appellate statistics used by the Court were 
accurate, they would prove that district and appellate court judges see roughly the 
same number of guidelines cases . . . . 
[However,] [t]here are strong indications that the Commission is dramatically 
underreporting the number of criminal appeals involving sentencing issues . . . . [I]f 
we apply what appears to be more accurate appellate data to our illustrative case, we 
see that if there are 100 guidelines cases sentenced at the district court level for every 
appellate judge, somewhere between 10 % and 20% of that number, or 10 to 20 actual 
cases, will reach the court of appeals.  Because each appellate case requires three 
judges, every appellate judge will hear thirty to sixty guidelines cases, as compared to 
the twenty heard by each district court judge.  In short, it appears that each appellate 
court judge hears not fewer, but between 50% and 200% more guidelines cases than 
does each district court judge.  Consequently, the empirical premise on which the 
Supreme Court bases its argument for the superior competence of district court judges 
to determine the “usualness” of a guidelines case collapses. 
 
Id.  
124Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. 
125See id. at 93. 
126See id. at 94. 
127See id. at 93-96. 
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3.  Analysis 
“The most widely recognized avenue of flexibility under the guidelines is the 
sentencing judge’s ability to depart from the prescribed sentencing range.”128  Due to 
the unlimited grounds that could possibly warrant departure, a world of possibilities 
are open to defendants and their attorneys when arguing in favor of departures from 
the Guidelines’ mandated sentence.  Departures under § 5K2.0 provide the “‘fine-
tuning’ for the Guidelines so that different defendants are treated differently based 
on offender characteristics.”129   
Though some judges’ reluctance to depart is understandable, it is misplaced.  
Koon v. United States appears to be the “most important development in the area of 
departures since the implementation of the sentencing guidelines.”130  The case 
“altered the ground rules for downward departure giving defense lawyers and judges 
more latitude.”131  The Supreme Court made it clear that it wanted “district courts to 
have more discretion to depart from the otherwise applicable guideline.”132  Koon 
appears to issue a “license to depart” to sentencing judges,133 and “[w]ith this green 
light . . . district courts [may] depart[] more often from the stated guidelines range 
where a judge believes that permissible considerations are present.”134  In fact, judges 
should utilize Koon as a basis for becoming “departure-happy”135 compared to their 
prior restraint under the Guidelines.  For those courts that “have taken to heart the 
language emphasizing sentencing judge discretion,”136 Koon can be interpreted to 
“permit both sentencing judges and appellate courts to consider fundamental issues 
of culpability and just punishment in deciding whether there should be a departure 
from the Guidelines.”137  Koon signifies a return to individualization in sentencing 
and the rise of true justice under the Guidelines.138 
                                                                
128Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the Sentencing Judge Under 
the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 10. 
129Saris, supra note 3, at 1043. 
130Hofer, supra note 102, at 284. 
131Ellis, supra note 98, at 35. 
132Frank Bowman, supra note 8, at 19. 
133Francesca Bowman, supra note 102, at 32. 
134Saris, supra note 3, at 1041. 
135Francesca Bowman, supra note 102, at 32. 
136Johnson, supra note 5, at 1747. 
137Stith & Cabranes, supra note 2, at 1277. 
138See Frank Bowman, supra note 8, at 19. 
“The hopeful view of Koon is that sentencing judges will expand their use of the 
departure power enough to ameliorate some of the harsher guidelines outcomes, but 
will move with sufficient restraint that they will neither imperil the guidelines 
structure in fact, nor be perceived as doing so by Congress, the bar, or the public.” 
 
Id.  But c.f., Francesca Bowman, supra note 102, at 32 for the proposition that the courts 
resolved the problems regarding the Guidelines lack of individualization prior to Koon, thus 
making the decision superfluous to sentencing law.   
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The Supreme Court’s approval of departures is demonstrated by its adoption of 
the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review.  Despite the claims of nay-
sayers who say that Koon did not change the standard,139 abuse of discretion is a 
lesser standard than the close scrutiny that appellate courts used prior to Koon.  
Indeed, abuse of discretion is “the most deferential standard of review available with 
the exception of no review at all.”140   
Furthermore, abuse of discretion is the standard of review that most fulfills the 
purposes of the Guidelines.  In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress stated that 
appellate courts “shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district 
court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district 
court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”141  This demonstrates that the 
legislature knew how to designate a specific standard of review when they intended 
it to be utilized. 
It is this “due deference” wording that caused the conflict regarding the proper 
standard of review intended by Congress.  However, the “legislative history of the 
original version of § 3742 leaves the unmistakable impression that Congress did not 
want the appellate courts to use de novo review.”142  Congress stated: 
Appellate courts have long followed the principle that sentences imposed 
by district courts within legal limits should not be disturbed . . . . The 
sentencing provisions of [the Act] are designed to preserve the concept 
that the discretion of a sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing 
and should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate court.  At the 
same time, they are intended to afford enough guidance and control of the 
exercise of that discretion to promote fairness and rationality, and to 
reduce unwarranted disparity, in sentencing.143 
Based upon this discussion, “due deference” cannot be viewed as authorizing de 
novo review.144  
                                                          
Koon may come too late in the evolution of sentencing guidelines.  During the nine 
years that the system has been straining to find ways to compensate for the unfairness 
in mandatory minimum penalties and some of the harsh outcomes of relevant conduct, 
the system seems more or less to have found its own answers through the mitigating 
aspects of plea agreements and substantial assistance motions. 
 
Id. 
139See supra note 102 and accompanying discussion. 
140Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
469, 480 (1988).  “These [appellate review] standards occupy a continuum of degrees of 
deference, ranging from no review at all, through such deferential standards as review for 
abuse of discretion and review for clear error, to plenary, or de novo review.”  Johnson, supra 
note 5, at 1706. 
14118 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1999). 
142Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty:  Appellate Review and the Sentencing 
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Abuse of discretion is the standard of review that best fulfills the intent of 
Congress.  The “due deference” language discloses that “the guidelines do not divest 
the district courts of all sentencing discretion; they merely guide and control the 
exercise of that discretion within a framework designed to eliminate unwarranted 
sentencing disparity.”145  Appellate courts would possess sufficient control over 
district court decisions to ensure compliance with the guidelines. 
Implicit in the concept of abuse of discretion is that the appellate court 
defers to the district court’s judgment but does not hesitate to step in if 
that judgment was exercised wrongly.  The key to abuse-of-discretion 
review is that it does not permit the appellate court simply to substitute its 
judgment for that of the district court.146 
Limited review is all that is necessary to avoid the problems that were experienced 
prior to the guidelines, when no review for sentencing decisions existed. 
Consequently, if the Commission was distressed by the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the abuse of discretion standard, it could have addressed the issue.   
Congress created the Sentencing Commission as a permanent body, 
charged not merely with developing an initial set of sentencing guidelines, 
but also with monitoring and evaluating those guidelines on an ongoing 
basis.  Thus the Commission is required to review the guidelines 
periodically and empowered to submit proposed amendments to the 
guidelines to Congress.147 
“The Guidelines’ sentencing ranges are a compendium of actual practice and are 
subject to periodic revision” based upon the Commission’s monitoring of courts and 
their departures.148  “The idea behind fine-tuning [of the Guidelines], of course, is 
that the twelve federal appellate courts can do an excellent job of discovering 
technical problems, minor inconsistencies, and other glitches in the drafting and 
structure of the guidelines that the Commission may have overlooked.”149  The 
Commission hopes to “learn from the courts’ reaction to its rules in order to improve 
sentencing procedures” and to “specify more precisely when departures should and 
should not be permitted.”150 
                                                          
“The congressional statement accompanying the 1988 amendment noted that it would 
be “inappropriate” for an appellate court to apply de novo review even to subjective 
determinations of the district court, such as whether a particular victim was “unusually 
vulnerable” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1.  The statement also indicated 
that “purely legal” determinations should be reviewed “more closely” under the 
deference standard, but it did not expressly approve of de novo review.” 
 
Id. at 637 n.58. 
145Id. at 636. 
146Id. at 637. 
147Becker, supra note 128, at 10. 
148Bornstein, supra note 19, at 146. 
149Zipperstein, supra note 142, at 628. 
150Bornstein, supra note 19, at 146. 
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A few examples exist which reveal that the Commission is in fact watching the 
courts’ sentencing decisions and responding when it feels that a response is 
necessary.  For example, when the Second Circuit reversed downward departures in 
two cases involving the receipt of child pornography,151 it did so and reluctantly 
noted that the defendants “were not a risk to the community, were only ‘passive’ 
participants in the offense who desired rehabilitation, and that the Bureau of Prisons 
lacked treatment programs.”152  The Commission considered and responded to these 
comments by transmitting a recommended amendment to Congress which “reduced 
the sentence recommended under the guidelines for mere receipt or possession of 
child pornography.”153  In this way, the Commission informed the legal world not 
only that it was doing its job, but that it considers suggestions from the courts. 
When the Second Circuit departed downward based upon a defendant’s youthful 
appearance and admitted bisexuality, which made him particularly vulnerable to 
victimization in prison,154 the Commission again responded.  The Commission gave 
voice to its disagreement over this matter by modifying § 5H1.4.  It provided that 
“appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
sentence outside the guidelines is justified.”155  Again, the Commission displayed its 
conviction to fulfill its statutory duty by addressing troublesome issues and by 
clarifying guidelines when necessary. 
If the Commission did not agree with the Koon Court’s declaration that the 
standard of review for departure decisions is abuse of discretion, it could have 
amended the Sentencing Guidelines to make this clear.  This is particularly important 
in light of the fact that “[t]he standard for departure is vital to the proper functioning 
of the guidelines system.”156  The Commission has not so altered the Guidelines; in 
fact, it seems to have done just the opposite.  The Commentary of § 5K2.0 was 
extended to include a discussion of Koon, which recognizes that the Court decided 
the case on an abuse of discretion standard.  The Commission does not present a new 
or unusual definition for this standard during this discussion; thus, the term must be 
given its traditional meaning. 
More evidence exists which demonstrates that Koon has altered the way the 
courts do business regarding departures.  For example, the decision “may have 
changed the rule that disparity among co-defendants is not a basis for departure.”157  
Traditionally, the circuits ruled that disparity was not a basis for departure.158  
                                                                
151See United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1990) and United States v. Deane, 
914 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1990). 
152Becker, supra note 128, at 12. 
153Id. 
154See United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1990). 
155Becker, supra note 128, at 12. 
156Gelacak, supra note 97, at 330. 
157ROGER W. HAINES, JR., ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 789 
(1998). 
158See United States v. Torres, 960 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Butt, 955 
F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446 (1st Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Arjoon, 964 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 
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However, the Court indicated that the traditional view may no longer be the law 
when it summarily vacated and remanded a Seventh Circuit case, Meza v. United 
States,159 that applied the traditional view. 
Another example of the manner in which Koon changed the departure landscape 
is displayed in United States v. Jones.160  Because “the fact-based assessment of 
whether [a defendant’s] post-offense rehabilitation efforts are exceptional falls 
within the realm of the district court’s ‘special competence’,”161 “cases barring 
departures for post-offense rehabilitation have been effectively overruled by 
Koon.”162  The Jones court also concluded, in regard to aberrant behavior departures, 
that “[t]he district court is in the best position to determine whether the crime is out 
of character for that individual.”163 
C.  Successful Considerations when Choosing Grounds for Departure 
1.  Rehabilitation 
After Koon, it appears that the Supreme Court encourages an approach to 
sentencing that “assumes a willingness to allow socially determined circumstances to 
mitigate culpability.”164  “Courts that take into account the background and the 
likelihood of the defendant to rehabilitate support their sentencing departures by 
invoking Congressional intent as derived from the Comprehensive Crime Control 
                                                          
1992); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Schular, 907 F.2d 
294 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. McKenley, 895 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Ives, 984 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Goldfaden, 959 
F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Parker, 912 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Evans, 924 
F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cea, 963 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Davila, 964 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Albers, 961 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Torres, 921 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164 
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nejia, 953 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoy, 
932 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Carpenter, 914 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 950 
F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748 (11th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
159519 U.S. 990 (1996), vacating United States v. Meza, 76 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(remanded for reconsideration in light of Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)). 
160158 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 1998). 
161Id. 
162HAINES, JR., supra note 157, at Supplement vol. 9, No. 12, at 11. 
163Jones, 158 F.3d at 500. 
164Bornstein, supra note 19, at 157.  Despite the broad discretion encouraged in Koon, one 
district court judge maintains that “appellate and district judges applying the Guidelines may 
have failed to recognize warranted disparity.”  Saris, supra note 3, at 1029. 
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Act and its legislative history.”165  The consideration of rehabilitation does not 
violate congressional policy in regards to sentencing “because Congress [itself] 
directed courts to consider all four goals of punishment in order to provide 
individualized sentences.”166  Congress also instructed that no one goal was superior 
to the others,167 and this should be reflected in sentencing policy.  However, due to 
their nature, the Guidelines fail “to achieve a proper balance of the four theories of 
punishment, favoring retribution and general deterrence, and relegating rehabilitative 
efforts to those convicted of only the least severe crimes.”168  Departures are a means 
of evening the balance between uniformity and individuality.169 
2.  Third Party Harm 
The first question to ask when considering a possible departure factor is “who 
benefits.”170  Whether third parties would benefit from a defendant’s conduct171 or 
from a departure seems to affect judges significantly when deciding whether or not a 
factor is worthy of departure.172  “[C]ollateral or related circumstances may properly 
give substance to the ultimate basis for departure.”173  “[P]reventing harm to third 
                                                                
165Bornstein, supra note 19, at 158. 
The purpose of the legislation was not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of 
individual sentences or for the guidelines to be imposed in a mechanistic fashion.  The 
Committee believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all relevant 
factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate 
case.  The purpose of the Guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the 
fairness of a sentence for an individual offender.   
 
Id. at 158 n.128; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (1988).   
166Bornstein, supra note 19, at 158.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (directing the courts 
to consider all four purposes of punishment in reaching a sentence). 
167S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1983).  Congress directed, “In setting out the 
four purposes of sentencing the Committee has deliberately not shown a preference for one 
purpose of sentencing over another in the belief that different purposes may play greater or 
lesser roles in sentencing for different types of offenses committed by different types of 
defendants.”  Id. at 77. 
168Bornstein, supra note 19, at 160; see also Rebello, supra note 19, at 1059 (“The 
Commission appears to have focused on the goal of uniformity.”).   
169See Houser, supra note 4, at 362.  “The guidelines further an essential need of the 
Anglo-American criminal justice system—to balance the desirability of a high degree of 
uniformity against the necessity for the exercise of discretion.  Id.  “Congress concluded that 
the Guidelines would reduce sentence disparities yet retain the flexibility needed to adjust for 
unanticipated factors arising in particular cases.”  Id. at 363. 
170Racz, supra note 5, at 1479. 
171See United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant not only paid 
extraordinary restitution to the bank from which he embezzled, but he explained to bank 
officials how they could detect improper transactions in the future). 
172There is a “trend of looking to collateral circumstances to gauge a factor’s quantitative 
weight.”  Selya & Kipp, supra note 25, at 34. 
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parties and reducing costs to society already seem to be the driving forces behind 
departures in actual . . . cases.”174 
In fact, many departures have been granted because someone other than the 
defendant would be negatively impacted by the defendant’s imprisonment.175  For 
example, departures were granted due to family circumstances,176 collateral business 
effects where employees would become unemployed due to the defendant’s possible 
incarceration,177 facilitation of the administration of justice,178 community service,179 
and post-offense or sentence rehabilitation.180  In regard to the family circumstances 
                                                          
173Id. at 36.  See also Racz, supra note 5, at 1486 n.146 (“[T]hird parties effects [are] 
effects that the Guidelines explicitly use to ground departures.  For example, the Guidelines 
permit departures when the defendant’s actions lead to certain third party effects such as 
death, extraordinary property damage or extreme physical or psychological injury.”)  Id. 
174Racz, supra note 5, at 1488. 
175See Johnson v. United States, 964 F.2d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1992) (the departure was 
not granted on behalf of the defendant, but on behalf of her family who depended on her). 
176See United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993) (defendant was solely 
responsible for the care of his mentally ill wife); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (the wife’s psychiatric problems were potentially life threatening and defendant 
was an “irreplaceable” part of her treatment); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 
1992) (defendant was a single mother who served as the sole support for her three small 
children under the age of six, her institutionalized daughter’s 6 year-old child, and her 17 year 
old son); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1993) (the 12 year old son of the 
woman defendant had been living with suffered various psychological problems as a result of 
his abusive father; the boy’s psychologists believed that defendant’s relationship with the boy 
was important to his progress and removing defendant could trigger a major regression); 
United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (single mother of three teenage 
children supported them without public assistance, and an exceptionally promising future of 
the older two children would be threatened by the prolonged incarceration of their mother); 
United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1991) (single mother of an infant also 
supported her older daughter who is also a single mother of an infant); United States v. Alba, 
933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991) (defendant’s imprisonment would destroy a strong family unit 
that consisted of the defendant, his wife, his two daughters, father and paternal grandmother; 
defendant maintained two jobs to take care of his family, and his father relied on the defendant 
for assistance in getting in and out of his wheelchair). 
177See United States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (judge found that 12 full-time 
employees would lose their jobs if the defendant was sentenced to prison); United States v. 
Milikowsky, 65 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1995) (judge held that up to 200 employees would lose their 
jobs if the defendant was sentenced to prison). 
178See United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1991) (defendant broke a “log jam” 
in the courts by pleading guilty); United States v. Stoffberg, 782 F. Supp. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(defendant provided substantial assistance in a congressional investigation). 
179See United States v. Turner, 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990) (due to defendant’s 
exemplary community service a departure was granted in order to not deprive the community 
of the defendant’s service). 
180At the resentencing hearing for Bernard Bradstreet, Judge Stearns stated, “I also think it 
significant that unlike the inmates in the cases I have cited, whose rehabilitative efforts were 
focused on their own self-improvement, Mr. Bradstreet’s efforts have been directed, in large, 
to others as well.”  13 Crim. Prac. Rep. (BNA) 30, 36 (Jan. 27, 1999) (quoting Tr. of 
Bradstreet Resent. Hr’g on 12/9/98). 
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departure, the unique circumstance must concern more than a single parent 
household.181 
When deciding whether to depart due to collateral consequences, the court should 
be encouraged to weigh the effects of the defendant’s actions and those of the 
prescribed sentence.182  Departure may be in order “when the effects of the 
defendant’s actions are ordinary and the effects of the defendant’s sentence are 
extraordinary.”183  Under these circumstances, the judge could argue that the 
defendant’s incarceration is not more important than “preventing the extreme harm 
that will come to [the third party] from the loss of the defendant’s emotional, 
physical, and economic support.”184 
3.  Voluntary Conduct 
Another factor which courts seem to take into consideration when determining 
whether a departure is in order is the voluntary conduct of a defendant.  This conduct 
spans a broad range of behavior, including a defendant’s voluntary return after 
escaping from prison,185 disclosure of identity,186 surrender to officials after failing to 
report for service of sentence,187 extraordinary cooperation by revealing to the police 
other undiscovered crimes,188 substantial assistance to the authorities despite the 
absence of a State motion requesting a departure,189 and voluntary restitution.190   
All of these conducts significantly ease the burden on governmental 
organizations by reducing their work load.  Courts seem to be of the opinion that 
such conduct should be “rewarded” with a downward departure because “28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(n) explicitly directed the Commission to assure that the guidelines reflect the 
general appropriateness of lesser sentences for defendants who substantially assist 
the prosecution.”191   
                                                                
181See Selya & Kipp, supra note 25, at 34. 
182See Racz, supra note 5, at 1486 indicating that there are three questions that the courts 
should ask in these circumstances:  “(1) What are the effects of the defendant’s actions?  (2) 
What are the effects of the prescribed sentence?  (3) How do these effects compare?”  Id. 
183Id. 
184Id. at 1488. 
185See United States v. Weaver, 920 F.3d 1570 (11th Cir. 1991).   
186See United States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1995). 
187See United States v. Crumb, 902 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1990). 
188See United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1994). 
189See United States v. Kay, 140 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. LaGuardia, 902 
F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines’ 
“Substantial Assistance”), 149 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
190See United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Lieberman, 
971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1991). 
191In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines’ “Substantial Assistance”), 149 F.3d 1198 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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However, this reduced burden is not the only reason that courts have granted 
departures based upon voluntary conduct.  Such voluntariness represents an 
acceptance of responsibility by the defendant that is not adequately considered by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.192   Just because the conduct may not fall within the heartland 
of the guideline does not necessarily mean that the defendant’s conduct does not 
warrant departure. Section 994 does not require a motion by the government 
requesting a departure in order for the court to consider a defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility, the Commission added that requirement in the Substantial Assistance 
Guideline. 
4.  Unfairness Resulting from Government Conduct 
Courts also seem to grant departures in order to alleviate any unfairness that may 
result from the conduct of government actors such as prosecutors or officers.  These 
departures mostly are not applied in order to punish the government for its 
questionable conduct, but rather to prevent that conduct from prejudicing the 
defendant. 
Several types of government misconduct resulted in departures for defendants.  
Departures have been granted when a defendant’s entrapment argument was not a 
perfect defense;193 investigating officers partook in sentencing entrapment;194 the 
government delayed in indicting the defendant;195 the prosecution improperly 
manipulated the defendant’s indictment;196 the prosecutor prejudiced the defendant 
by communicating directly with a represented defendant regarding plea 
negotiations;197 the prosecutor held an improper ex parte communication with the 
defendant and failed to notify defendant’s counsel when soliciting the defendant’s 
grand jury testimony;198and there was a delay in transferring an alien defendant to 
federal custody.199 
                                                                
192Conduct may not fall within § 3E1.1, the guideline allowing for a reduction for a 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, for various reasons such as if the defendant puts the 
government to its burden of proof or if the defendant receives an enhancement under § 3C1.1, 
which results from obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. 
193See United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garza-
Juarez, 992 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1991). 
194See United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Montoya, 62 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Graham, 146 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 
1241 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124 (9th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanchez, 138 
F.3d 1410 (11th Cir. 1998). 
195See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanchez-
Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998). 
196See United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992). 
197See United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997). 
198See United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 458 (9th Cir. 1994). 
199See United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Also, an alcoholic defendant that binged during an unsupervised furlough and 
was unable to return to the prison on time because of a lack of funds was given a 
departure because the conduct was due to the “ill-advised decision” of the releasing 
prison official.200  Another defendant was granted a departure when the statutory 
maximum nullified the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility reduction.201  When 
an investigating officer not only engaged in a reverse sting operation, but engaged in 
a sexual relation with the target, the court determined that a departure was in order 
despite the fact that such conduct on the government’s behalf did not equate to a 
complete defense of entrapment.202  The Sixth Circuit also held that a court may 
consider a departure based upon the government’s improper investigative techniques 
which targeted and induced African-American parolees to commit crimes.203 
Thus, if the government’s behavior has been questionable, prejudicial or harmful 
to the defendant’s case or person an argument can be made for a downward 
departure that should pass the “straight face test.”  However, the harm to the 
defendant must be shown to be a function of the improper government conduct.  If 
the circumstances do not pass the “but-for test” then a departure will not be 
granted.204 
5.  “Just Desserts” 
The courts appear to be tailoring sentences according to the culpability of the 
defendants in order to give them their “just desserts,” but not more punishment than 
they have really earned.  This culpability is examined regarding not only the conduct 
of the individual defendant, but in some cases the conduct of others individuals 
involved in the specific crimes is explored. 
Several examples demonstrate that courts are using a “just desserts” philosophy 
when sentencing.  Downward departures have been granted when the guidelines or 
the loss (harm) overstated the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s 
criminality.205  When a victim suffered loss due to the defendant’s crime but other 
causes contributed to the loss, courts have seen fit to depart downward.206  A court 
has also granted a departure when a defendant’s criminal history category overstated 
the defendant’s criminality due to state sentencing disparity.  The defendant had a 
                                                                
200See United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1990). 
201See United States v. Rodriguez, 64 F.3d 638 (11th Cir. 1995). 
202See United States v Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  For more examples in 
which government conduct resulted in a downward departure, see Table One. 
203See United States v. Coleman, 138 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 1998). 
204See United States v. Parker, 158 F.3d 1312 (1998) (departure was not granted on the 
basis of the overemployment of SWAT, despite the defendant’s significant injuries, because 
the defendant could not show that this factor was directly responsible for his injuries). 
205See United States v. Shattuck, 961 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Stuart, 22 
F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Restrepo, 936 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
206See United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Arutunoff, 
1 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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number of traffic offenses which the judge concluded resulted from the phenomenon 
of “driving while black.”207  Departures were authorized when a defendant’s conduct 
demonstrated that he intended to pay his taxes208 or displayed a lack of 
sophistication.209   
Consideration of the individual defendant’s culpability is being examined more 
and more in relation to the conduct of other people involved in the crime.  For 
example, a “mule,” or drug courier, was granted a departure because a person in his 
position is not as culpable as the other participants in a drug crime.210  A departure 
was given to a defendant when the principle offender in the drug conspiracy was 
given a deal in exchange for his testimony against lesser members of the conspiracy 
because the court determined that the deal directly resulted in unacceptable prejudice 
to the defendant.211  Such sentencing disparity should be considered to be against the 
policy of the Sentencing Guidelines.  When the “big fish” hangs the “little fish” out 
to dry, justice is not served for the person of greater culpability is receiving a lesser 
sentence than the person who is not as bad an actor.  Consequently, disparity 
between co-defendants may be a valid basis for departure after Koon.212  Courts 
considered extraordinary disparity even prior to the Koon decision; 213 however, by 
remanding a co-defendant disparity departure that was rejected, the Supreme Court 
recognized that Koon encouraged departures, and this encouragement may extend to 
circumstances in which co-defendants receive grossly disproportionate sentences.214 
6.  Judges 
Another factor to consider when arguing for departure is the individual judge and 
his or her theories of justice and penology.215  This factor should be examined 
                                                                
207See United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998). 
208See United States v. Brennick, 134 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1998). 
209See United States v. Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1990). 
210See United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1992). 
211See United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473 (8th Cir. 1998). 
212See United States v. Meza, 519 U.S. 990 (1996). 
213See United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Seligsohn, 
981 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268 (6th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Torres, 81 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sardin, 921 
F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alpert, 989 F.2d 454 (11th Cir. 1993). 
214See Meza v. United States, 519 U.S. 990 (1996). 
215See Bornstein, supra note 19, at 146.  “The variance [in relation to departures] reflects 
different judges own preferences for different theories of punishment . . .”  Id.  For an example 
of the reasoning underlying such a departure, see United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 954-
55 (1st Cir. 1993).  The court explained: 
When I look at these cases of sentencing, the first thing I ask myself is, “What 
sentence would I impose if there were no guidelines?”  That’s what I did for more than 
20 years.  And then I ask myself, “What’s a just sentence in these circumstances?  Am 
I going to be limited by these artificial guidelines made by people who have no idea of 
what kind of a case I’m going to have to decide?”  No two cases are the same . . . .  
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because “in a significant minority of cases, departure is driven by the sentencing 
judge’s desire to reach a result different from that specified in the Guidelines, rather 
than by the presence of meaningfully atypical facts.”216  In fact, many judges depart 
in order to further the goal of rehabilitation.217  Thus, a judge may depart based upon 
a factor that is not actually valid because he or she feels that justice would not be 
done under the guidelines.  In light of the Koon decision, it appears that “only the 
most plainly illegal departures should fail under the deferential standard adopted.”218 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In light of Koon, “departures are a flourishing practice.”219  Section 5K2.0 can 
humanize America’s criminal justice system through its provision for departures 
based upon any ground that is meaningfully relevant to any particular case.  The 
individualization of the guidelines sentencing system will remove the blindfold from 
the eyes of Justicia, and result in true justice, not the “canned” version to which we 
are accustomed.  “Depart!  Depart!  Depart!  Departures are the lifeblood of the 
Guidelines process!”220 should be the rallying cry of Justicia and her followers. 
The imagination is a fertile stomping ground—explore it when considering 
factors for departure.221  As Alan Ellis, a nationally recognized expert on sentencing, 
advocated: 
Be creative.  Don’t pigeonhole yourself to downward departures identified 
in the guidelines themselves.  Think of things that make your case 
unusual.  Remember that not only must your offender have been an 
unusual offender, but if the offense behavior is unusual in and of itself—
specifically, less serious than envisioned by the guidelines—this is a good 
ground for an “unusual” case as defined by Koon: one that is outside the 
heartland of the guidelines justifying a downward departure.222 
Remember that “sentencing is more of an art than an exact science.”223  Try to 
make your departure argument appealing to the eye by painting it in shades of 
                                                          
Id. 
216See Gelacak, supra note 97, at 364. 
217See Bornstein, supra note 19, at 146. 
218Abraham L. Clott, An Assistant Public Defender Responds to Koon, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 
25, 25 (1996). 
219Wright, supra note 8, at 569. 
220Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE 
L.J. 2053, 2070 (1992) (remarks of Judge Vincent L. Broderick, United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York). 
221See United States v. Walker, 27 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 1994) (arguing that post-arrest “self-
inflicted punishment” should warrant a departure) and United States v. Parker, 158 F.3d 1312 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (arguing that the overemployment of SWAT should warrant departure) for 
examples where defense attorneys utilized their imagination and earned an A+ for effort 
despite the fact that their grounds were rejected. 
222Ellis, supra note 98, at 35. 
223Houser, supra note 4, at 388. 
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“acceptance of responsibility via voluntary conduct,” “rehabilitation,” “collateral 
third-party consequences,” and “just desserts.”  However, each case is its own canvas 
and its circumstances may produce other less common hues.  Utilize every factor 
possible in your departure argument and you may produce a masterpiece. 
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TABLE 1224 
Downward Departure Grounds Approved by Appellate Courts 
Aberrant behavior United States v. Grandmaison, 77 
F.3d 555 (1st Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18 
(1st Cir. 1989) 
United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61 
(2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 
752, 761 (3d Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059 
(4th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 
25, 26 (5th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Burleson, 22 F.3d 93 
(5th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 
376 (6th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 
640 (7th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Carey 895 F.2d 318 
(7th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Jenkins, 78 F.3d 
1283 (8th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813 
(8th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 
161, 164 (8th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 
836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 282 (1991) 
United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738 
(9th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Fairless, 975 F.2d 
664 (9th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Morales, 972 F.2d 
1007 (9th Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 
(10th Cir. 1991) 
 
                                                                
224Several resources were relied upon when compiling the information for Table 1.  See 
ROGER W. HAINES, JR., ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK § 5K2.0 (Nov. 
1998 ed.); ROGER W. HAINES, JR., ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING & FORFEITURE GUIDE § 5K2.0 
(3d ed. 1999); ROGER W. HAINES JR., ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES NEWSLETTERS 
(Jan. 4, 1999 – Mar. 29, 1999); Jeane G. Chutuape, et al., Departures (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Feb. 20, 1998).  Table 1 rearranges and expands upon a table of departures found 
in another source.  See HAINES, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES NEWSLETTER, Table 1. 
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United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 
1438, 1431-42 (10th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Withrow 85 F.3d 527 
(11th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Dyce, 78 F.3d 610 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) 
Alien’s cultural assimilation 
 
United States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 
726 (9th Cir. 1998) 
Atypicality of money laundering scheme 
 
United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 
176 (2d 1991) 
Burden of successive prosecutions 
 




United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648 
(2d Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Crouse, 145 F.3d 
786 (6th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 
1132 (8th Cir. 1998) 
Childhood abuse United States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 478 
(9th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216 
(9th Cir. 1992) 
Credit for time served on expired 
sentence 
United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 
641 (8th Cir. 1998) 
Criminal history score mirrors racial 
disparities in state sentencing (“Driving 
while Black”) 
United States v. Leviner, No. 97-
10260-NG, Second Amended Order 
Re: Sentencing 12/22/98 
Defendant’s conduct did not threaten the 
harm sought to be prevented by the 
statutes 
United States v. Bernal, 90 F.3d 465 
(11th Cir. 1996) 
Defendant fails to comprehend the 
socially unacceptable nature of child 
pornography, thus, he/she lacks mens rea 
United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462 
(1st Cir. 1994) 
Defendant received no personal benefit 
from money laundering 
 
United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 
452 (2d Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Walters, 87 F.3d 663 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 
498 (1996) 
Defendant’s tragic personal history United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 
1293 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 
916 (4th Cir. 1990) 
Defendant’s “youthful lack of 
guidance”225 
United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 
1096 (9th Cir. 1991) 
                                                                
225The Commission specifically excluded a defendant’s lack of guidance as a youth or 
disadvantaged upbringing as a reason for departure  when it added § 5H1.12.  See UNITED 
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Delay in indictment and sentencing 
prevented concurrent sentences 
United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 
641 (8th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 
161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998) 
Delay in transferring alien to federal 
custody 
United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 
F.3d 697  (2d Cir. 1998) 
Deportable alien status may result in 
exceptional hardship 
United States v. Farovil, 124 F.3d 
838 (7th Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 
F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1996) 




United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 
533 (3d Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 
(4th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Pullen, 88 F.3d 368, 
370-71 (7th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 
822 (9th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 
F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506 
(9th Cir. 1993) 
Disparity between co-defendants United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454 
(2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 
1418 (3d Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 
1096 (5th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. v. Williams, 894 F.2d 
208 (6th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 
1268 (6th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Torres, 81 F.3d 900 
(9th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Sardin, 921 F.2d 
1064 (10th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Alpert, 989 F.2d 454 
(11th Cir. 1993) 
Extraordinary level of cooperation by 
revealing other undiscovered crimes 
 
United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 
343 (6th Cir. 1994) 
                                                          
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Appendix C, amendment 386, 
effective November 1, 1991. 
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Family Circumstances 
 
United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 
970 (1st Cir. 1993)  
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 
(2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 
124 (2d Cir. 1992)  
United States v. Galante, 128 F.3d 
788 (2d Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 
(3d Cir. 1993)  
United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 
793 (3d Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Owens, 145 F.3d 923 
(7th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 
790 (8th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 
(10th Cir. 1991)  
United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 
561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)  
United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. 
Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 
Government misconduct 
 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Coleman, 138 F.3d 
616 (6th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309 
(9th Cir. 1997)226 
United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 
458 (9th Cir. 1994) 
Guidelines overstate the seriousness of 
the offense 
 
United States v. Restrepo, 936 F.2d 
661 (2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Alba, 933 F.3d 1117 
(2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 
(2d Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 
1061 (3d Cir. 1990) 
Improper manipulation of indictment United States v. Liberman, 971 F.2d 
989 (3d Cir. 1992) 
 
Incomplete defense of entrapment 
 
United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 
717 (9th Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 
F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1991) 
 
                                                                
226The defendant suffered prejudice because plea negotiations were held without 
defendant’s counsel present. 
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Increase for aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies 
 
United States v. Hines, 803 F. Supp. 
675, 676-79 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 
992 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Cuevas-Gomez, 61 
F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 
F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Rios-Favela, 118 
F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1997) 
Intent to pay taxes 
 
United States v. Brennick, 134 F.3d 
10 (1st Cir. 1998) 
Job loss to innocent third parties 
 
United States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28 
(1st Cir. 1996) 
Lack of knowledge of purity of drugs 
 
United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 
510 (9th Cir. 1997) 
Lack of sophistication United States v. Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 
61 (2d Cir. 1990) 
Lesser harm 
 
United States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8 
(1st Cir. 1996) 
Loss of credit while defendant was in 
INS custody 
United States v. Ogbondah, 16 F.3d 
498 (2d Cir. 1994) 
Loss overstated criminality of defendant United States v. Shattuck, 961 F.2d 
1012 (1st Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Sturart, 22 F.3d 76 
(3d Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Monoco, 23 F.3d 
793 (3d Cir. 1994) 
Loss resulting from fraudulently 
obtained loan not caused solely by the 
defendant’s misrepresentation 
(“multiple causation of loss”) 
United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 
341 (1st Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 
1112 (10th Cir. 1993) 
Military record United States v. Pipich, 902 F. Supp. 
1991 (D. Md. 1988) 
“Mules” ineligible for § 3B1.2 
mitigating role adjustment 
United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 




United States v. Little, 736 F. Supp. 
71 (D. NJ), aff’d, 919 F.2d 137 (3d 
Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d 
327 (4th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Greenwood, 928 
F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648 
(2d Cir. 1996) 
Plea bargain in full satisfaction of all 
federal charges which may be brought 
United States v. Paton, 110 F.3d 562 
(8th Cir. 1997) 
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Principal’s reduced sentence in 
exchange for testimony against lesser 
members of conspiracy directly results 
in prejudice to a defendant 
(“Big Fish” hangs the “little fish” out to 
dry) 
United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473 
(8th Cir. 1998) 
Prison official’s “ill-advised decision” to 
send an alcoholic on an unsupervised 
furlough 
United States v. Whitehorse, 909 
F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1990) 
Rehabilitation United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107 
(1st Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944 
(2d Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 
688 (2d Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74 
(2d Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Bryson, 163 F.3d 
742 (2d Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76 
(3d Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Brock, 108 F.3d 31, 
35 (4th Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Maddalena, 893 
F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 
112 S. Ct. 233 (1991) 
United States v. Kapitzke, 13 F.3d 
820 (8th Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Green, 152 F.3d 
1202 (9th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Jones, 158 F.3d 492 
(10th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Whitaker, 152 F.3d 
1238 (10th Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Williams, 948 F.2d 
706 (11th Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 
1375 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Harrington, 741 F. 
Supp. 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
Remorse 
 
United States v. Jaroszenko, 92 F.3d 
486 (7th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 
1280 (10th Cir. 1998) 
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Restitution United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 
452 (2d 1995) 
United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 
989 (3d Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 
161 (8th Cir. 1991) 
Sentencing entrapment United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 
1991, 196 (1st Cir. 1992) 
United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Graham, 146 F.3d 6 
(1st Cir. 1998) 
United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 
424 (8th Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241 
(8th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 
1103 (9th Cir. 1994) 
United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 
1325 (9th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Parrilla, 114 F.3d 
124 (9th Cir. 1997) 
United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 
(10th Cir. 1996) 
United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 
1410 (11th Cir. 1998) 
Statutory maximum nullified acceptance 
of responsibility reduction 
United States v. Rodriguez, 64 F.3d 
638 (11th Cir. 1995) 
Substantial assistance when motion not 
made by the government 
 
United States v. Kay, 140 F.3d 86 (2d 
Cir. 1998) 
United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 
1010 (1st Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 
1212 (3d Cir. 1993) 
United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 
1229 (5th Cir. 1990) 
In re Sealed Case (Sentencing 
Guidelines’ “Substantial 
Assistance”), 149 F.3d 1198 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) 
Susceptibility to abuse in prison due to 
status as police officers and due to 
unusual degree of national press 
coverage 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 
(1996) 
Voluntary disclosure of identity United States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109 
(3d Cir. 1995) 
Voluntary return after escape from 
prison 
United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 
1570 (11th Cir. 1991) 
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Voluntary surrender to officials after 
failing to report for service of sentence 
United States v. Crumb, 902 F.2d 
1337 (8th Cir. 1990) 
Vulnerability to victimization in 
prison.227 
 
United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 
(2d Cir. 1990) 
United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 
525 (2d Cir. 1991) 
United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 
791 (4th Cir. 1995) 
United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 
336 (D.C. 1990) 
United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 
1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
 
                                                                
227The Commission amended § 5H1.4 to state that physical appearance, including 
physique, is not ordinarily relevant when determining whether a departure is appropriate.  See 
Appendix C, amendment 466, effective November 1, 1992. 
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